Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they Are revision theorists too

Greg Restall*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

But exactly which are the non-paradoxical instances of (1)? Which instances can we endorse? Some are unproblematic: the grounded propositions pose no problem in Thanks to Otaávio Bueno, Mark Colyvan, Daniel Nolan, Graham Priest, Roy Sorensen and Achille Varzi and to the audience at the University of Otago for enjoyable discussions on this topic. Thanks to JC Beall and Brad Armour-Garb for their paper ‘‘Minimalism and the epistemic approach to paradox’’ [5], which raised many of the issues discussed here.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDeflationism and paradox
EditorsJC Beall, Bradley Armour-Garb
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherBritish Academy (Oxford University Press)
Chapter7
Pages97-106
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781383043358
ISBN (Print)9780199287116
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Oct 2023

Keywords

  • Bueno
  • Exactly
  • Paradoxical
  • Propositions
  • Unproblematic

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