Minimal virtue

Julia Driver*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Accounts of virtue can be divided along a continuum between the robust and the minimal . The more robust an account of virtue is, the more psychological requirements it places on the possession of virtue; the most minimal account places the barest of psychological requirements on virtue. This essay presents arguments in favor of opting for a minimal account of virtue. The opening of the paper explores historical trends in the development of virtue theory that support this. The remainder of this essay discusses some of the arguments raised and suggested by historical figures in light of work on virtue by contemporary writers, and then makes a case for going even more minimal in our theory of virtue.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97-111
Number of pages15
JournalMonist
Volume99
Issue number2
Early online date21 Mar 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2016

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