Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind

Lisa Bastian

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01385-y

Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind

Lisa Bastian

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.

Original language	English
Number of pages	22
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	First Online
Early online date	9 Dec 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01385-y
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 9 Dec 2019

Keywords

Epistemic rationality
Right-kind reasons
Wrong-kind reasons
Coherence
Pragmatic reasons

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10.1007/s11098-019-01385-yLicence: CC BY

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title = "Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind ",

abstract = "This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the {\textquoteleft}right kind{\textquoteright} and the {\textquoteleft}wrong kind{\textquoteright}. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.",

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author = "Lisa Bastian",

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N2 - This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.

AB - This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.

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KW - Right-kind reasons

KW - Wrong-kind reasons

KW - Coherence

KW - Pragmatic reasons

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SN - 0031-8116

VL - First Online

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

ER -

Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind

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Keywords

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