Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind

Lisa Bastian

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophical Studies
VolumeFirst Online
Early online date9 Dec 2019
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 9 Dec 2019


  • Epistemic rationality
  • Right-kind reasons
  • Wrong-kind reasons
  • Coherence
  • Pragmatic reasons


Dive into the research topics of 'Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this