Memory, belief and time

Brian James Weatherson

doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250

Memory, belief and time

Brian James Weatherson

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.

Original language	English
Journal	Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume	45
Issue number	5-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250
Publication status	Published - 8 Jan 2016

Keywords

Memory
Knowledge
Belief
Rationality
Time

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10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250

Memory, Belief and Time
© 2015 Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250
Accepted author manuscript, 131 KB

Cite this

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KW - Knowledge

KW - Belief

KW - Rationality

KW - Time

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Memory, belief and time

Abstract

Keywords

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