Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination

M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Inspired by the model of Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994, in imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organisations (R. P. Gilles and P. H. M. Ruys, Eds.), Chap. 2, Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic), I define a class of abstract games, called maximum games, which are dominance-solvable. In the leading subclass of games of common interest, they are solvable on the unique Pareto-dominant outcome. Maximum games include, as economic applications, some types of Bertrand games and public good games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.(C) 2000 Academic Press.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)97-105
    Number of pages9
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume31
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2000

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