Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination

M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)


    Inspired by the model of Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994, in imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organisations (R. P. Gilles and P. H. M. Ruys, Eds.), Chap. 2, Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic), I define a class of abstract games, called maximum games, which are dominance-solvable. In the leading subclass of games of common interest, they are solvable on the unique Pareto-dominant outcome. Maximum games include, as economic applications, some types of Bertrand games and public good games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.(C) 2000 Academic Press.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)97-105
    Number of pages9
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2000


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