Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution

M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    12 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The Nash Bargaining Solution is characterised by using the new axiom of Maximal Symmetry in place of Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Symmetry. This axiom expresses the idea that a fair arbitrator should treat symmetric alternatives in the same way, subject to the feasibility constraint. An advantage of the proposed characterisations is that they are valid on a wide set of domains, in particular domains including, or consisting of, non-convex problems.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)45-53
    Number of pages9
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    Volume17
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jan 2000

    Keywords

    • NONCONVEX PROBLEMS
    • BARGAINING SOLUTION
    • EXTENSION

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