Lesser-evil justifications: a reply to Frowe

Kerah Gordon-Solmon, Theron Gene Pummer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
3 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Sometimes one can prevent harm only by contravening rights. If the harm one can prevent is great enough, compared to the stringency of the opposing rights, then one has a lesser-evil justification to contravene the rights. Non-consequentialist orthodoxy holds that, most of the time, lesser-evil justifications add to agents’ permissible options without taking any away. Helen Frowe rejects this view. She claims that, almost always, agents must act on their lesser-evil justifications. Our primary task is to refute Frowe’s flagship argument. Secondarily, it is to sketch a positive case for nonconsequentialist orthodoxy.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages8
JournalLaw and Philosophy
VolumeFirst Online
Early online date4 Aug 2022
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 4 Aug 2022

Keywords

  • Lesser-Evil Justifications
  • Helen Frowe

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