Legal Uncertainty, Penalties and the Limits to Effects-Based Standards

David Tregear Ulph, Yannis Katsoulacos

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

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    Abstract

    This Chapter reviews some recent literature on optimal Legal Standards and in particular on how the optimal standard to be chosen is affected by legal uncertainty and by the penalties imposed by the Competition Authority for violating Competition Law. It shows that, contrary to the claims of many legal scholars: effects-based standards do not necessarily entail legal uncertainty; decision errors are neither a necessary nor sufficient conditions for existence of legal uncertainty; if penalties can be set appropriately Effects-Based standards with some degree of legal uncertainty welfare dominate Effects-Based standards with no legal uncertainty which in turn welfare dominate Per Se Standards; penalties may be higher when there is some degree of legal uncertainty than when there is none.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationHandbook on European Competition Law
    Subtitle of host publicationEnforcement and Procedure
    EditorsDaniel Geradin, Ioannis Lianos
    Place of PublicationUK
    PublisherEdward Elgar
    Pages584-592
    Number of pages15
    VolumeII
    ISBN (Electronic)9781782546214
    ISBN (Print)9781782546092
    Publication statusPublished - Oct 2013

    Publication series

    NameElgar original reference

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