Legal pluralism’s other: mythologizing modern law

Caroline Humfress

doi:10.1017/S0738248023000172

Legal pluralism’s other: mythologizing modern law

Caroline Humfress^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This article interrogates the concept of legal pluralism, as it currently tends to function within contemporary legal and historical scholarship. It argues that the concept of legal pluralism cannot 'liberate' positivist analytical legal theory from monist (municipal, state-centric etc.) straightjackets, but rather itself presumes the primacy of centralized state-issued law - at the same time as masking that primacy within a pluralist discourse. The concept of legal pluralism should be properly understood – and analyzed – as part of the mythology of modern law, not as an alternative to it.

The first two sections develop this argument via a critical tour of legal-pluralist historiography, focusing on 1986 to the present-day. The final section then moves on to explore what is at stake for the pre-modern historian when they apply (modern) concepts of legal pluralism to try to explain the multiplicity of legal orders that they invariably encounter in their own source material.

Original language	English
Number of pages	14
Journal	Law and History Review
Volume	FirstView
Early online date	9 Jun 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0738248023000172
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 9 Jun 2023

Access to Document

10.1017/S0738248023000172Licence: CC BY

Humfress_2023_Legal_pluralism_LHR_CCBY
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Society for Legal History. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Final published version, 274 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{7f8569b9c1ee46f7b4f5107451da64d7,

title = "Legal pluralism{\textquoteright}s other: mythologizing modern law",

abstract = "This article interrogates the concept of legal pluralism, as it currently tends to function within contemporary legal and historical scholarship. It argues that the concept of legal pluralism cannot 'liberate' positivist analytical legal theory from monist (municipal, state-centric etc.) straightjackets, but rather itself presumes the primacy of centralized state-issued law - at the same time as masking that primacy within a pluralist discourse. The concept of legal pluralism should be properly understood – and analyzed – as part of the mythology of modern law, not as an alternative to it. The first two sections develop this argument via a critical tour of legal-pluralist historiography, focusing on 1986 to the present-day. The final section then moves on to explore what is at stake for the pre-modern historian when they apply (modern) concepts of legal pluralism to try to explain the multiplicity of legal orders that they invariably encounter in their own source material. ",

author = "Caroline Humfress",

year = "2023",

month = jun,

day = "9",

doi = "10.1017/S0738248023000172",

language = "English",

volume = "FirstView",

journal = "Law and History Review",

issn = "0738-2480",

publisher = "Maney",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Legal pluralism’s other

T2 - mythologizing modern law

AU - Humfress, Caroline

PY - 2023/6/9

Y1 - 2023/6/9

N2 - This article interrogates the concept of legal pluralism, as it currently tends to function within contemporary legal and historical scholarship. It argues that the concept of legal pluralism cannot 'liberate' positivist analytical legal theory from monist (municipal, state-centric etc.) straightjackets, but rather itself presumes the primacy of centralized state-issued law - at the same time as masking that primacy within a pluralist discourse. The concept of legal pluralism should be properly understood – and analyzed – as part of the mythology of modern law, not as an alternative to it. The first two sections develop this argument via a critical tour of legal-pluralist historiography, focusing on 1986 to the present-day. The final section then moves on to explore what is at stake for the pre-modern historian when they apply (modern) concepts of legal pluralism to try to explain the multiplicity of legal orders that they invariably encounter in their own source material.

AB - This article interrogates the concept of legal pluralism, as it currently tends to function within contemporary legal and historical scholarship. It argues that the concept of legal pluralism cannot 'liberate' positivist analytical legal theory from monist (municipal, state-centric etc.) straightjackets, but rather itself presumes the primacy of centralized state-issued law - at the same time as masking that primacy within a pluralist discourse. The concept of legal pluralism should be properly understood – and analyzed – as part of the mythology of modern law, not as an alternative to it. The first two sections develop this argument via a critical tour of legal-pluralist historiography, focusing on 1986 to the present-day. The final section then moves on to explore what is at stake for the pre-modern historian when they apply (modern) concepts of legal pluralism to try to explain the multiplicity of legal orders that they invariably encounter in their own source material.

UR - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-history-review/firstview

U2 - 10.1017/S0738248023000172

DO - 10.1017/S0738248023000172

M3 - Article

SN - 0738-2480

VL - FirstView

JO - Law and History Review

JF - Law and History Review

ER -

Legal pluralism’s other: mythologizing modern law

Abstract

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this