Knowledge, inquiry and dogmatism

Jessica Anne Brown

doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05008-4

Knowledge, inquiry and dogmatism

Jessica Anne Brown^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The popular idea that knowledge is the aim of inquiry appears to licence a specific form of dogmatism: once one knows the answer to a question, one ought to decline further evidence bearing on it. For, in knowing the answer to the question, one has already met the aim of inquiry. And by gathering further evidence one risks losing that knowledge by acquiring misleading evidence. After distinguishing the relevant form of dogmatism from standard dogmatism, I reject a range of different responses to this challenge including that gathering further evidence may answer alternative inquiries, the idea that the aim of inquiry is not knowledge but something stronger, or appeal to the personal aims of inquirers. Here I argue that none of these replies are adequate and instead suggest a solution that appeals to situation-sensitive epistemic norms on inquiry.

Original language	English
Article number	174
Number of pages	16
Journal	Synthese
Volume	205
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05008-4
Publication status	Published - 10 Apr 2025

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Cite this

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