Knowledge for nothing

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Abstract

Let Entitlement Epistemology be the theory of knowledge which says that entitlement—a special kind of unearned warrant to accept or believe—can help us successfully address a range of sceptical arguments. Prominent versions of this theory urge that epistemology should not be concerned with knowledge (and similar externalist states) but rather with justification, warrant, and entitlement (at least insofar as these are conceived of as internalist states). Knowledge does not come first, half-way, or even last in epistemological theorising—rather, it ought to come nowhere. The goal in what follows is two-fold: Firstly, to assess whether this extreme internalist version of Entitlement Epistemology is at all sustainable. (We shall find that it is not.) Secondly, to articulate a version of Entitlement Epistemology which arguably does much better. On the view to be explored, knowledge does not drop out of the epistemological picture: if we allow that there can be warrant for nothing, then there can be knowledge for nothing too.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEpistemic Entitlement
EditorsPeter J. Graham, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter14
ISBN (Print)9780198713524
Publication statusPublished - 19 Feb 2020

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