Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual

Jonathan Ichikawa

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9403-9

Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual

Jonathan Ichikawa

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I criticize Timothy Williamson's characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	435-443
Number of pages	9
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	145
Issue number	3
Early online date	11 Apr 2009
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9403-9
Publication status	Published - Sept 2009

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10.1007/s11098-009-9403-9

Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology: Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology
Brown, J. A. (PI), Cappelen, H. W. (CoI), Onofri, A. (Student), Porro, L. C. (Student), Cath, Y. W. (Researcher), Huvenes, T. T. (Researcher) & Ichikawa, J. (Researcher)
Arts and Humanities Research Council
3/09/08 → 31/08/12
Project: Standard

Cite this

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Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual

Abstract

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Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology: Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology

Cite this