Knowing How Without Knowing That

Yuri Willem Cath

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and Intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative shows how even if the arguments given here succeed it might still be reasonable to hold that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKnowing How
Subtitle of host publicationEssays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
EditorsJohn Bengson, Marc A. Moffett
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages135
ISBN (Print)9780195389364
Publication statusPublished - 2011


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