Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertions

Alessandro Rossi

doi:10.1007/s11841-021-00831-x

Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertions

Alessandro Rossi

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.

Original language	English
Number of pages	21
Journal	Sophia
Volume	First Online
Early online date	19 Apr 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00831-x
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 19 Apr 2021

Keywords

Leibniz
Existence
Kant
Russell
Onotological arguement

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10.1007/s11841-021-00831-xLicence: CC BY

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AB - Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.

KW - Leibniz

KW - Existence

KW - Kant

KW - Russell

KW - Onotological arguement

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VL - First Online

JO - Sophia

JF - Sophia

ER -

Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertions

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