Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertions

Alessandro Rossi

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Abstract

Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages21
JournalSophia
VolumeFirst Online
Early online date19 Apr 2021
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 19 Apr 2021

Keywords

  • Leibniz
  • Existence
  • Kant
  • Russell
  • Onotological arguement

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