Joint Attention and the Notion of Subject: Insights from Apes, Normal Children, and Children with Autism

Juan Carlos Gómez*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter proposes that the cognitive mechanisms of joint attention (defined as a combination of attention following skills with attention contact skills) are not metarepresentational in nature, but based upon the coordination of two different types of intentional understanding -thirdperson and second-person intentions -that are represented at the level of a sensorimotor notion of others as subjects. This proposal is developed and analyzed from a comparative perspective through a review of findings concerning apes, typically developing children, and children with autism. It is argued that each of these populations illustrates a different type of joint attention system based upon different notions of the other as a subject.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationJoint Attention Communication and Other Minds
Subtitle of host publicationIssues in Philosophy and Psychology
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191715303
ISBN (Print)9780199245635
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2010

Keywords

  • Autism
  • Intentionality
  • Metarepresentation
  • Non-human primates
  • Subject
  • Theory of mind

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Joint Attention and the Notion of Subject: Insights from Apes, Normal Children, and Children with Autism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this