Abstract
This chapter proposes that the cognitive mechanisms of joint attention (defined as a combination of attention following skills with attention contact skills) are not metarepresentational in nature, but based upon the coordination of two different types of intentional understanding -thirdperson and second-person intentions -that are represented at the level of a sensorimotor notion of others as subjects. This proposal is developed and analyzed from a comparative perspective through a review of findings concerning apes, typically developing children, and children with autism. It is argued that each of these populations illustrates a different type of joint attention system based upon different notions of the other as a subject.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Joint Attention Communication and Other Minds |
Subtitle of host publication | Issues in Philosophy and Psychology |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191715303 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199245635 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2010 |
Keywords
- Autism
- Intentionality
- Metarepresentation
- Non-human primates
- Subject
- Theory of mind