John Buridan on Non-Contingency Syllogisms

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

2 Citations (Scopus)
2 Downloads (Pure)


Whereas his predecessors attempted to make sense of, and if necessary correct, Aristotle's theory of the modal syllogism, John Buridan starts afresh in his Treatise on Consequences, treating separately of composite and divided modals, then of syllogisms of necessity, possibility, and with mixed premises. Finally, he comes in the penultimate chapter of the treatise, Book IV ch. 3, to present a concise treatment of syllogisms with premises of contingency, that is, two-sided possibility. The previous modal syllogisms had all been taken with an affirmed mode only, since modal conversion equates negated necessity and possibility with affirmed possibility and necessity, respectively. But in his Conclusions concerning syllogisms of contingency, he also treats those with negated mode. These are the non-contingency syllogisms.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Road to Universal Logic
Subtitle of host publicationFestschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau
EditorsArnold Koslow, Arthur Buchsbaum
Place of PublicationBasel
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-10193-4
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-10192-7
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

Publication series

NameStudies in Universal Logic


Dive into the research topics of 'John Buridan on Non-Contingency Syllogisms'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this