John Buridan on Non-Contingency Syllogisms

Stephen Read

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10193-4_21

John Buridan on Non-Contingency Syllogisms

Stephen Read

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed)

3 Citations (Scopus)

2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Whereas his predecessors attempted to make sense of, and if necessary correct, Aristotle's theory of the modal syllogism, John Buridan starts afresh in his Treatise on Consequences, treating separately of composite and divided modals, then of syllogisms of necessity, possibility, and with mixed premises. Finally, he comes in the penultimate chapter of the treatise, Book IV ch. 3, to present a concise treatment of syllogisms with premises of contingency, that is, two-sided possibility. The previous modal syllogisms had all been taken with an affirmed mode only, since modal conversion equates negated necessity and possibility with affirmed possibility and necessity, respectively. But in his Conclusions concerning syllogisms of contingency, he also treats those with negated mode. These are the non-contingency syllogisms.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The Road to Universal Logic
Subtitle of host publication	Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau
Editors	Arnold Koslow, Arthur Buchsbaum
Place of Publication	Basel
Publisher	Birkhauser
Pages	447-456
Number of pages	10
Volume	1
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-10193-4
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-10192-7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10193-4_21
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2015

Publication series

Name	Studies in Universal Logic
Publisher	Birkhäuser

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-10193-4_21

Cite this

@inbook{bc7e242eb101414e8dcb118fbb62dffc,

title = "John Buridan on Non-Contingency Syllogisms",

abstract = "Whereas his predecessors attempted to make sense of, and if necessary correct, Aristotle's theory of the modal syllogism, John Buridan starts afresh in his Treatise on Consequences, treating separately of composite and divided modals, then of syllogisms of necessity, possibility, and with mixed premises. Finally, he comes in the penultimate chapter of the treatise, Book IV ch. 3, to present a concise treatment of syllogisms with premises of contingency, that is, two-sided possibility. The previous modal syllogisms had all been taken with an affirmed mode only, since modal conversion equates negated necessity and possibility with affirmed possibility and necessity, respectively. But in his Conclusions concerning syllogisms of contingency, he also treats those with negated mode. These are the non-contingency syllogisms.",

author = "Stephen Read",

year = "2015",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-10193-4_21",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-319-10192-7",

volume = "1",

series = "Studies in Universal Logic",

publisher = "Birkhauser",

pages = "447--456",

editor = "Arnold Koslow and Arthur Buchsbaum",

booktitle = "The Road to Universal Logic",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - John Buridan on Non-Contingency Syllogisms

AU - Read, Stephen

PY - 2015/1/1

Y1 - 2015/1/1

N2 - Whereas his predecessors attempted to make sense of, and if necessary correct, Aristotle's theory of the modal syllogism, John Buridan starts afresh in his Treatise on Consequences, treating separately of composite and divided modals, then of syllogisms of necessity, possibility, and with mixed premises. Finally, he comes in the penultimate chapter of the treatise, Book IV ch. 3, to present a concise treatment of syllogisms with premises of contingency, that is, two-sided possibility. The previous modal syllogisms had all been taken with an affirmed mode only, since modal conversion equates negated necessity and possibility with affirmed possibility and necessity, respectively. But in his Conclusions concerning syllogisms of contingency, he also treats those with negated mode. These are the non-contingency syllogisms.

AB - Whereas his predecessors attempted to make sense of, and if necessary correct, Aristotle's theory of the modal syllogism, John Buridan starts afresh in his Treatise on Consequences, treating separately of composite and divided modals, then of syllogisms of necessity, possibility, and with mixed premises. Finally, he comes in the penultimate chapter of the treatise, Book IV ch. 3, to present a concise treatment of syllogisms with premises of contingency, that is, two-sided possibility. The previous modal syllogisms had all been taken with an affirmed mode only, since modal conversion equates negated necessity and possibility with affirmed possibility and necessity, respectively. But in his Conclusions concerning syllogisms of contingency, he also treats those with negated mode. These are the non-contingency syllogisms.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-10193-4_21

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-10193-4_21

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 978-3-319-10192-7

VL - 1

T3 - Studies in Universal Logic

SP - 447

EP - 456

BT - The Road to Universal Logic

A2 - Koslow, Arnold

A2 - Buchsbaum, Arthur

PB - Birkhauser

CY - Basel

ER -

John Buridan on Non-Contingency Syllogisms

Abstract

Publication series

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this