Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts

Francesco Palazzo; Min Zhang

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027

Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts

Francesco Palazzo, Min Zhang

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Abstract

We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	37-40
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	158
Early online date	24 Jun 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027
Publication status	Published - Sept 2017

Keywords

Asymmetric learning
Information disclosure

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10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027

Zhang_2017_EL_Boomsandbusts_AAM
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027
Accepted author manuscript, 538 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Min Zhang
- mz47st-andrews.acuk
- Economics (Business School) - Lecturer
Person: Academic

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title = "Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts",

abstract = "We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — {\textquoteleft}boom{\textquoteright} or {\textquoteleft}bust{\textquoteright} — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.",

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AB - We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.

KW - Asymmetric learning

KW - Information disclosure

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 158

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EP - 40

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts

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Keywords

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