Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts

Francesco Palazzo, Min Zhang

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)37-40
    Number of pages4
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume158
    Early online date24 Jun 2017
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Sept 2017

    Keywords

    • Asymmetric learning
    • Information disclosure

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this