Independent Monetary Policies and Social Equity

Andrew Hughes Hallett, D Weymark

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Monetary policy is formulated as a game between the government and the central bank. We show that, when fiscal policy has a redistributional component, there is a conflict between optimally configured monetary policies and equality. Consequently, inflation averse governments interested in social equity will need to limit their use of fiscal policy. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)103-110
    Number of pages8
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume85
    Issue number85
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Oct 2004

    Keywords

    • monetary independence
    • central bank conservatism
    • monetary policy
    • income redistribution
    • FISCAL-POLICIES
    • COMMITMENT
    • DISCRETION

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