TY - JOUR
T1 - Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands
AU - McElwee, Brian Michael
N1 - From the issue entitled "Special Issue Section: Moral Theory in Health Care Ethics".
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.
AB - Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational.
UR - http://www.springerlink.com/content/r4020877836p6681/
U2 - 10.1007/s10677-010-9256-5
DO - 10.1007/s10677-010-9256-5
M3 - Article
SN - 1386-2820
VL - 14
SP - 457
EP - 466
JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
IS - 4
ER -