Hyperintensionality and overfitting

Franz Berto*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson’s Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection.
Original languageEnglish
Article number117
Publication statusPublished - 8 Apr 2024


  • Aboutness
  • Subject matters
  • Topics
  • Possible worlds semantics
  • Hyperintensional semantics


Dive into the research topics of 'Hyperintensionality and overfitting'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this