Hyperintensionality and overfitting

Franz Berto

doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04556-5

Hyperintensionality and overfitting

Franz Berto^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson’s Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection.

Original language	English
Article number	117
Journal	Synthese
Volume	203
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04556-5
Publication status	Published - 8 Apr 2024

Keywords

Aboutness
Subject matters
Topics
Possible worlds semantics
Hyperintensional semantics

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10.1007/s11229-024-04556-5Licence: CC BY

Berto_2024_Synthese_Hyperintentionality-overfitting_CC
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Final published version, 412 KBLicence: CC BY

The Logic of Conceivability: H2020 ERC The Logic of Conceivability
Berto, F. (PI)
1/09/18 → 31/12/21
Project: Fellowship

Cite this

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title = "Hyperintensionality and overfitting",

abstract = "A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson{\textquoteright}s Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection.",

keywords = "Aboutness, Subject matters, Topics, Possible worlds semantics, Hyperintensional semantics",

author = "Franz Berto",

note = "Funding: This research is published within the project {\textquoteleft}The Logic of Conceivability{\textquoteright}, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant No. 681404.",

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N1 - Funding: This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant No. 681404.

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N2 - A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson’s Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection.

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KW - Aboutness

KW - Subject matters

KW - Topics

KW - Possible worlds semantics

KW - Hyperintensional semantics

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ER -

Hyperintensionality and overfitting

Abstract

Keywords

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Projects

The Logic of Conceivability: H2020 ERC The Logic of Conceivability

Cite this