Abstract
Hume's notion of artificial virtue seems to fail to explain what he designed it to explain, viz., our approval of justice and our abhorrence of injustice. I argue that we can make sense of his account only if we understand the motivation to be artificially virtuous to be grounded, on Hume's view, in a misconception of the true value of the artificial virtues.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Hume |
| Subtitle of host publication | Moral and Political Philosophy |
| Editors | Rachel Cohon |
| Publisher | Dartmouth Press |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
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