Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues

Marcia Baron

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


Hume's notion of artificial virtue seems to fail to explain what he designed it to explain, viz., our approval of justice and our abhorrence of injustice. I argue that we can make sense of his account only if we understand the motivation to be artificially virtuous to be grounded, on Hume's view, in a misconception of the true value of the artificial virtues.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHume
Subtitle of host publicationMoral and Political Philosophy
EditorsRachel Cohon
PublisherDartmouth Press
Publication statusPublished - 2001


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