Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues


Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)


Hume's notion of artificial virtue seems to fail to explain what he designed it to explain, viz., our approval of justice and our abhorrence of injustice. I argue that we can make sense of his account only if we understand the motivation to be artificially virtuous to be grounded on Hume's view, in a misconception of the true value of the artificial virtues.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)539-555
Number of pages17
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1982


Dive into the research topics of 'Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this