Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues

M BARON

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Hume's notion of artificial virtue seems to fail to explain what he designed it to explain, viz., our approval of justice and our abhorrence of injustice. I argue that we can make sense of his account only if we understand the motivation to be artificially virtuous to be grounded on Hume's view, in a misconception of the true value of the artificial virtues.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)539-555
Number of pages17
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume12
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1982

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