Hugo Grotius: how to be (and not be) a universalist

Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis libri tres was published in 1625. It was first a major statement on natural law. It soon became a foundational text within the international law, particularly around the use of force. Over time, it has become a classic in the field, due in some ways to the politics of international law but in other ways because of its profound insights. In this paper, I examine Grotius’ ‘method’ for want of a better word. His natural law argument is based not solely on appeal to Biblical or classical texts (though it certainly does that). It also looks to historical contexts in a way that brings in practice alongside of theory. While others had done this, Grotius’ ability to base his argument on both theory and practice has something to teach us in the contemporary era. I argue that Grotius provides us with a way to argue for universal values – by drawing not only on theories but on the practices that shape those theories. At the same time, the colonial legacy of Grotius’ work (brought out by Martine van Itersum’s foundational work in this area) highlights how our positionality should also caution us when making universalist claims. That is, while I argue for universal values, I recognize my location in the scholarly world, like Grotius’, is a privileged one. I will continue to make those arguments, but the lessons of Grotius’ work leads me to be cautious and humble in how and where I make those arguments.