How to prove Hume’s Law

Gillian Russell

doi:10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3

How to prove Hume’s Law

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Abstract

This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.

Original language	English
Number of pages	30
Journal	Journal of Philosophical Logic
Volume	First Online
Early online date	24 Nov 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 24 Nov 2021

Keywords

Hume’s Law
Barriers to entailment
Philosophical logic
Invalidity
Logical consequence

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Cite this

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How to prove Hume’s Law

Abstract

Keywords

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