The principle of Universal Instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior's paradox or Kaplan's paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free-logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free-logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramificationist approaches to higher-order logic. Our assessment of both approaches is largely pessimistic, and we remain reluctantly inclined to take Prior's and Kaplan's derivation at face value.
|Title of host publication
|Williamson on Modality
|Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, Mark McCullagh
|Place of Publication
|Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
|Published - 18 Jul 2017