Group belief for a reason

Jessica Brown*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper I investigate what it is for a group to believe something for a reason. I defend a non-summative account on which a group can believe that p for a reason even though none of its members believe that p for that reason. By contrast, a summative account would hold that the reason for which a group believes that p is a function of the reason(s) for which its members believe that p. I argue that the proposed non-summative account deals better with cases in which members of a group believe that p for different reasons. I also defend it against a range of objections, including that it conflicts with epistemic norms for assertion and action.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-22
JournalAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Issue number1
Early online date31 May 2022
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2022

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