God as moral anti-examplar in Spinoza

This paper addresses the question of whether Spinoza subscribes to moral exemplarism, defined as any moral theory including the idea that it is morally good, right, virtuous, praiseworthy, or obligatory to emulate certain figures identified as moral exemplars. The answer is given at multiple levels. At one level, Spinoza endorsed moral exemplarism as a descriptive theory of how we make moral judgements, but does not endorse those judgements. At another level he endorses judgements of good and bad based on conformity to a constructed exemplar of human nature, although the endorsement is perhaps pragmatic rather than moral. At a third level, Spinoza offers as the highest ethical ideal the emulation of God. But since Spinoza’s God is a being devoid of goals and even of any determinate character, emulating it seems to mean rejecting the whole ethical project of trying to find an exemplar to guide one’s moral choices and development.