Abstract
We investigate the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic development when women are discriminated against in the labor market. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which capital accumulation drives economic development. The government appoints bureaucrats to administer public policy. Corruption arises due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds. In the event of detection and dismissal, the private sector serves as the bureaucrats' outside option. Our main results can be summarized as follows: first, when the public sector is a more gender-equal employer than the private sector, female bureaucrats are less corrupt than male; second, corruption and development are jointly determined allowing the possibility of a poverty trap; and third, a policy to increase female participation in the public sector potentially reduces corruption and fosters economic development.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 12793 |
| Pages (from-to) | 2133-2156 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Review of Development Economics |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 2 Jun 2021 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 11 Nov 2021 |
Keywords
- Corruption
- Economic development
- Gender inequality
Access to Document
- Forgues-Puccio-2021-Gender-inequality-RODE-12793-CCBY
Copyright © 2021 The Authors. Review of Development Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.