Gender Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage: The Bargaining Family Under Scrutiny

Helmut Rainer

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Citations (Scopus)


    We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as "equal sharing" are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)305-329
    Number of pages25
    JournalJournal of Population Economics
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2008


    • gender discrimination
    • family bargaining
    • reputation
    • MARKET
    • POWER
    • MODEL


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