Abstract
We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as "equal sharing" are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 305-329 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Journal of Population Economics |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2008 |
Keywords
- gender discrimination
- family bargaining
- reputation
- HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR
- MARKET
- POWER
- MODEL