Further Thoughts on Tarski’s T-scheme and the Liar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In 'The Truth Schema and the Liar', I criticised Tarski's formulation of the T-schema and proposed a revised truth-condition which promises to solve the semantic paradoxes by rendering them all false. I have left that paper unchanged in the light of objections raised in the other papers in this volume, and respond to those criticisms in the present paper. I also elaborate further the historical background to the proposal.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationUnity, Truth and the Liar
Subtitle of host publicationThe Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox
EditorsShahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo, Emmanuel Genot
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages205-225
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4020-8468-3
ISBN (Print)978-1-4020-8467-6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
Volume8

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