Abstract
A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the liar is that not all assumptions are for free. One merit of this proposal is that it is free from the revenge problem.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 115-135 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | American Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2001 |
Keywords
- TRUTH
- Liar Paradox
- Supposition
- Revenge problem