Fragmentation and the preface paradox

Ethan Lai

doi:10.1017/epi.2025.20

Fragmentation and the preface paradox

Ethan Lai^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The preface paradox is often taken to show that beliefs can be individually rational but jointly inconsistent. However, this received conflict between rationality and consistency is unfounded. This paper seeks to show that no rational beliefs are actually inconsistent in the preface paradox

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-10
Number of pages	10
Journal	Episteme
Volume	First View
Early online date	15 Apr 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.20
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 15 Apr 2025

Keywords

Fragmentation
The preface paradox
Belief system
Consistency

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10.1017/epi.2025.20Licence: CC BY

Lai_2025_Episteme_Fragmentation-Preface-Paradox_CC
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Final published version, 166 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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KW - Belief system

KW - Consistency

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Fragmentation and the preface paradox

Abstract

Keywords

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