For Bayesians, rational modesty requires imprecision

Brian James Weatherson

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Gordon Belot (2013) has recently developed a novel argument against Bayesianism. He shows that there is an interesting class of problems that, intuitively, no rational belief forming method is likely to get right. But a Bayesian agent’s credence, before the problem starts, that she will get the problem right has to be 1. This is an implausible kind of immodesty on the part of Bayesians.

My aim is to show that while this is a good argument against traditional, precise Bayesians, the argument doesn’t neatly extend to imprecise Bayesians. As such, Belot’s argument is a reason to prefer imprecise Bayesianism to precise Bayesianism.
Original languageEnglish
Article number20
Issue number20
Publication statusPublished - 2015


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