Extending Nash's axioms to nonconvex problems

M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    16 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Nash's axioms are extended to a domain of nonconvex problems to characterise in a simple way the Extended Nash Bargaining Solution proposed by Conley and Wilkie (1996, Games Econ. Behav. 13, 26-38). Independence of irrelevant alternatives is weakened on the new domain to lake into account the possibility that the solution of the convexified problem constitutes a "relevant" alternative. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)377-383
    Number of pages7
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume22
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 1998

    Keywords

    • BARGAINING PROBLEM
    • EXTENSION

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