Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies

Ryan K. Beasley; Juliet Kaarbo

doi:10.1111/isqu.12164

Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies

Ryan K. Beasley^*, Juliet Kaarbo

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	729-740
Number of pages	12
Journal	International Studies Quarterly
Volume	58
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12164
Publication status	Published - 11 Dec 2014

Keywords

International conflict behavior
Decision-making
Institutional constraints
Diversionary force
Initiation
Presidentialism
Deficits
Systems
Peace

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10.1111/isqu.12164

Beasley-Kaarbo ISQ open access
© 2014 International Studies Association. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12164
Accepted author manuscript, 333 KB

Ryan Keith Beasley
- rb68st-andrews.acuk
- School of International Relations - Senior Lecturer
- Centre for Global Law and Governance
Person: Academic

Cite this

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Explaining extremity in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies

Abstract

Keywords

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Ryan Keith Beasley

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