Existence As a Real Property

Francesco Berto*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

What does existence consist in, if it is not what the Parmenidean takes it to be? Here comes a non-Parmenidean approach. To begin with, “exists” is a predicate of individuals just like the others – a predicate for real, not only from the point of view of our ordinary language’s surface grammar. It is a predicate in the same sense that “eats”, “flies”, and “is a man” are. The modo materiali, ontological counterpart of the semantic thesis, is that existence is a genuine, non-blanket property of individuals, just as the properties of eating, flying, being a man.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSynthese Library
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages61-83
Number of pages23
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameSynthese Library
Volume356
ISSN (Print)0166-6991
ISSN (Electronic)2542-8292

Keywords

  • Bare Plural
  • Causal Feature
  • Causal Power
  • Existential Quantifier
  • Fictional Character

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