Evidence and Intuition

Yuri Willem Cath

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Many philosophers accept a view—what I will call the intuition picture—according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson (2004, 2007 Ch, 1) has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgments relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that it: (I) is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence but also the nature of evidence in general, including Williamson's famous view that E=K; (II) can maintain the central claims about the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy made by proponents of the intuition picture; (III) does not collapse into Williamson’s own deflationary view of the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy; and (IV) does not lead to scepticism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)311-328
Number of pages18
JournalEpisteme
Volume9
Issue number04
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2012

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