Epistemic logic with partial grasp

Francisca Silva

doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1

Epistemic logic with partial grasp

Francisca Silva^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to more realistically characterize the epistemic life of agents. To show this, I propose an epistemic logic with partial grasp that has in mind considerations from first-order aboutness theory with the aim of avoiding certain forms of logical omniscience, and which provides an alternative to immanent closure (Yablo Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014).

Original language	English
Article number	92
Number of pages	27
Journal	Synthese
Volume	204
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1
Publication status	Published - 29 Aug 2024

Keywords

Subject matter
Aboutness
First order
Immanent closure
Epistemic logic

Access to Document

10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1Licence: CC BY

Silva_2024_Synth_Epistemic-logic-with-partial-grasp_CC
Copyright 2024 The author(s). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
Final published version, 442 KBLicence: CC BY

https://franciscasilva.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/epistemic-logic-with-partial-grasp.pdf

Cite this

@article{6221c924171f47ec8cbfd452a12ed155,

title = "Epistemic logic with partial grasp",

abstract = "We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to more realistically characterize the epistemic life of agents. To show this, I propose an epistemic logic with partial grasp that has in mind considerations from first-order aboutness theory with the aim of avoiding certain forms of logical omniscience, and which provides an alternative to immanent closure (Yablo Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014).",

keywords = "Subject matter, Aboutness, First order, Immanent closure, Epistemic logic",

author = "Francisca Silva",

note = "Funding: Funda{\c c}{\~a}o para a Ci{\^e}ncia e a Tecnologia (grant number 2021.06938.BD).",

year = "2024",

month = aug,

day = "29",

doi = "10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1",

language = "English",

volume = "204",

journal = "Synthese",

issn = "1573-0964",

publisher = "Springer",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Epistemic logic with partial grasp

AU - Silva, Francisca

N1 - Funding: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (grant number 2021.06938.BD).

PY - 2024/8/29

Y1 - 2024/8/29

N2 - We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to more realistically characterize the epistemic life of agents. To show this, I propose an epistemic logic with partial grasp that has in mind considerations from first-order aboutness theory with the aim of avoiding certain forms of logical omniscience, and which provides an alternative to immanent closure (Yablo Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014).

AB - We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to more realistically characterize the epistemic life of agents. To show this, I propose an epistemic logic with partial grasp that has in mind considerations from first-order aboutness theory with the aim of avoiding certain forms of logical omniscience, and which provides an alternative to immanent closure (Yablo Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014).

KW - Subject matter

KW - Aboutness

KW - First order

KW - Immanent closure

KW - Epistemic logic

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1

DO - 10.1007/s11229-024-04738-1

M3 - Article

SN - 1573-0964

VL - 204

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

M1 - 92

ER -

Epistemic logic with partial grasp

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this