Eliciting information from a committee

Andriy Zapechelnyuk*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)


    The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2049-2067
    Number of pages19
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Issue number5
    Publication statusPublished - Sept 2013


    • Axiomatic bargaining
    • Closed rule
    • Collusion
    • Communication
    • Experts
    • Multidimensional mechanism design


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