Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

Georgios Gerasimou

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)165-171
    Number of pages7
    JournalEconomic Theory Bulletin
    Issue number2
    Early online date8 Nov 2018
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2019


    • Dominance solvability
    • Vector payoffs
    • Incomplete preferences
    • Multicriteria games
    • Equilibrium refinement


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