Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

Georgios Gerasimou

doi:10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2

Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

Georgios Gerasimou

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	165-171
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economic Theory Bulletin
Volume	7
Issue number	2
Early online date	8 Nov 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2
Publication status	Published - Dec 2019

Keywords

Dominance solvability
Vector payoffs
Incomplete preferences
Multicriteria games
Equilibrium refinement

Access to Document

10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2Licence: CC BY

Gerasimou_2018_ETB_Dominance-solvable_ CC
Copyright © The Author(s) 2018. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Final published version, 311 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{2260586c627d42ba88de2b164f05b908,

title = "Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences",

abstract = "This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin{\textquoteright}s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin{\textquoteright}s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.",

keywords = "Dominance solvability, Vector payoffs, Incomplete preferences, Multicriteria games, Equilibrium refinement",

author = "Georgios Gerasimou",

year = "2019",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2",

language = "English",

volume = "7",

pages = "165--171",

journal = "Economic Theory Bulletin",

issn = "2196-1093",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

AU - Gerasimou, Georgios

PY - 2019/12

Y1 - 2019/12

N2 - This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.

AB - This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.

KW - Dominance solvability

KW - Vector payoffs

KW - Incomplete preferences

KW - Multicriteria games

KW - Equilibrium refinement

U2 - 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2

DO - 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2

M3 - Article

SN - 2196-1093

VL - 7

SP - 165

EP - 171

JO - Economic Theory Bulletin

JF - Economic Theory Bulletin

IS - 2

ER -

Dominance solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this