Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance

K Blackburn, Gonzalo Felipe Forgues Puccio

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    35 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1534-1563
    Number of pages30
    JournalEuropean Economic Review
    Volume51
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Aug 2007

    Keywords

    • corruption
    • inequality
    • development
    • ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT
    • INCOME-DISTRIBUTION
    • POVERTY TRAPS
    • TRICKLE-DOWN
    • CORRUPTION
    • GROWTH
    • COUNTRIES
    • EQUILIBRIUM
    • ALLOCATION
    • TALENT

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