Deviant logic and the paradoxes of self reference

Greg Restall*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paradoxes of self reference have to be dealt with by anyone seeking to give a satisfactory account of the logic of truth, of properties, and even of sets of numbers. Unfortunately, there is no widespread agreement as to how to deal with these paradoxes. Some approaches block the paradoxical inferences by rejecting as invalid a move that classical logic counts as valid. In the recent literature, this 'deviant logic' analysis of the paradoxes has been called into question. This disagreement motivates a re-examination of the philosophy of formal logic and the status of logical truths and rules. In this paper I do some of this work, and I show that this gives us the means to defend the 'deviant' approaches against such criticisms. As a result I hope to show that these analyses of the paradoxes are worthy of more serious consideration than they have so far received.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)279-303
Number of pages25
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume70
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 1993

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