Deviance and vice: strength as a theoretical virtue in the epistemology of logic

Gillian Russell*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue of strength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well‐defined property of logical strength is neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic of scientific strength, and the third is that many modern logics are on a par—or can be made to be on a par—with respect to scientific strength.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)548-563
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume99
Issue number3
Early online date17 Apr 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2019

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