Deliberation, reasons, and alternatives

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Abstract

A plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question‐directed: it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at issue. I argue that the best explanation for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)682-702
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume100
Issue number3
Early online date5 Nov 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 27 Sept 2019

Keywords

  • Deliberation
  • Reasons
  • Alternatives
  • Ethics
  • Reasoning

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