Abstract
A plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make
sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central
sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question‐directed:
it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it
makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a
case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at
issue. I argue that the best explanation for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 682-702 |
| Journal | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 5 Nov 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 27 Sept 2019 |
Keywords
- Deliberation
- Reasons
- Alternatives
- Ethics
- Reasoning
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Justin Snedegar
- School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies - Senior Lecturer
- Philosophy - Senior Lecturer
- Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology
Person: Academic