Abstract
The paradoxes of self-reference are genuinely paradoxical. The liar paradox, Russell's paradox, and their cousins pose enormous difficulties to anyone who seeks to give a comprehensive theory of semantics, or of sets, or of any other domain which allows a modicum of self-reference and a modest number of logical principles.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Revenge of the liar |
| Subtitle of host publication | new essays on the paradox |
| Editors | JC Beall |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | British Academy (Oxford University Press) |
| Chapter | 12 |
| Pages | 262-271 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781383036794 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199233915, 9780199233908 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 31 Oct 2023 |
Keywords
- Boolean
- Genuinely
- Non-classical
- Revenge
- Self-reference