Abstract
The paradoxes of self-reference are genuinely paradoxical. The liar paradox, Russell's paradox, and their cousins pose enormous difficulties to anyone who seeks to give a comprehensive theory of semantics, or of sets, or of any other domain which allows a modicum of self-reference and a modest number of logical principles.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Revenge of the liar |
Subtitle of host publication | new essays on the paradox |
Editors | JC Beall |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | British Academy (Oxford University Press) |
Chapter | 12 |
Pages | 262-271 |
Number of pages | 10 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781383036794 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199233915, 9780199233908 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 31 Oct 2023 |
Keywords
- Boolean
- Genuinely
- Non-classical
- Revenge
- Self-reference