CSTO and the agency of small members: the case of Kyrgyzstan

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) originated from the 1992 Collective Security Treaty (CST), designed primarily to foster collective security among the newly independent states emerging from the Soviet Union's dissolution. The treaty was a direct response to the security and defence challenges following the USSR's collapse, with substantial ambitions at its inception. These ambitions evolved notably when the CST transitioned into a formal regional organisation in 2002, with six member states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) reafirming their commitment to regional security cooperation. Despite these aspirations, the CSTO has faced significant challenges in fulfilling its principal mission of collective defence, as articulated in Article 4 of its charter. The organisation has only been activated once, during the Qandy Qantar events in Kazakhstan in 2022, despite several preceding crises and requests for intervention from its member states [1]. Consequently, much of the existing academic discourse characterises the CSTO as largely nominal and dysfunctional, with Tolipov famously describing it as an example of "collective confusion" [2]. This article offers a divergent perspective, arguing that the CSTO's perceived inactivity and symbolic nature nonetheless serve the national interests of its member states. This article explores the CSTO's alignment with––and adaptation to––the foreign policy objectives of Russia, the dominant power, even in periods of organisational inactivity. By focusing on a smaller member state, Kyrgyzstan, the analysis highlights the benefits of the CSTO not only for Russia but also for the "junior partners" within the organisation's framework. This perspective provides a nuanced explanation of the functions and evolution of the CSTO, illustrating how member states outside Russia utilise the organisation to their advantage.